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SPEECH OF SEi&TOR l.fiKE MAI1SFIELD (D. , MOHTAilA)
For Release Weds . A.M. 's, Apr. 20, 1960
OlPI·ER MONGOLIA AIID NEWSMEiJ TO CHINA
Suggested New Approaches
Mr . President:
It has long been the policy of this government not to establish
diplomatic relations with the Chinese government at Peking.

And so far as

I am aware, the Peking government has not indicated any desire to establish
diplomatic relations 1·rith this nation.

'l'he Chinese in Peking, in short, ap-

pear to be as 1·redded to the continuance of the present diplomatic situation
as we are .
The question of whether or not to seek to establish diplomatic relations- - to extend official recognition depends on many factors.

I presume

that this Administration has ,.,eighed these factors in the same unemotional,
objective and non-political fashion as its predecessor, and has come to the
same conclusion:

that to establish diplomatic relations with Peking is not

in our national interest.

I do not quarrel with that decision.

The Executive

Branch has custody of all the facts uhich go into the decision and the responsibility for the decision ultimately rests with that branch.

I must say,

however, that on the basis of such information that is public, it seems to me
that the decision of the Executive Branch, in this connection, is the correct
one.
Whether or not to establish diplomatic relations 1·Ti th any nation is
one question.

Whether or not to seek unofficial contacts is another.

And in

this situation, it seems to me that any avenue of contact which may help us to
understand and to act intelligently on what is one of the most formidable developments of our times--the emergence and transformation of China into a
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militant communist state) is not only not to be avoided but is to be sought out.
I assume that this is one of the major considerations which has prompted this
Administration to keep a representative

ta~~ing

munist counterpart in Geneva and Warsaw since

on and off with a Chinese Com-

1954. I assume that this is one

of the considerations which prompts the Administration to spend public funds in
obtaining, wherever possible, information about developments within China and
in analyzing and interpreting this information.

I assume that this is one of

the considerations which inspires various departments of the Administration to
spend public funds in training employees in the Chinese language .
It seems to me that no opportunity should be lost for providing to
the people of the nation--no less than to those who conduct foreign policy-as much objective information about developments in China ao can be obtained.
That information should be drawn, if it is at all possible, from the actual
source of the developments.
Since the Communists achieved military supremacy on the Chinese
mainland, American journalists have been trying to do this job of informationgathering for the American people in much the same way as the Executive Branch
does for its official purposes .

They have tapped much the same pecond-hand

sources in Hong Kong, Formosa and other places along the rim of China and
elsewhere.

They have put together a scattering of facts and rumors with the

glue of speculative interpretation.

Most American journalists recognize, I

believe, that this is an inadequate way to do their job even though it is the
best that can be done in present circumstances.
But some years ago, apparently, an opportunity existed for reporters
to get news as they would prefer to get it- - first-hand in China.

That op-

portunity, which depended on the cooperation of the Exectuve Branch, was
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withheld for a time.

Many months later the Executive Branch recognized the

right of the newsmen to go but the situation had changed.

By then, the Chinese

Communists had closed the door which, for a U',Or:!ent, app,..ared to have ope::necl.
I do not knovr what it will require now to get American newsmen into
China.

I do not know whether any arrangement is even possible .

I believe now,

however, as I did when the issue first arose, that it will be greatly in the
interests of this nation if the newsmen can gain entry.

If for no other reason,

it will give the people of the United States an opportunity to check, against
their objective reporting, the second-hand composite picture of the cataclysmic
changes in China which trickles down to us through the sieve of speculation.
In the long-run, if our present policies with respect to China are to maintain
their validity, in this as in any other matter, they must be supported by public
attitudes arrived at through an independent evaluation of the facts.

The fail-

ure to grasp the opportunity to gain entry into China in the past, the failure
now to seek to recpen the opporttmity helps our policies not at all, and serves
only to deny to the people of the United States the contribution which a free
press is intended, under the Constitution, to provide to them in the conduct of
the public business.
While the responsibility for paving the way rests within the Administration, I would suggest most respectfully, that a sincere and determined
effort be made at this time to reach some agreement with Peking for the reciprocal exchange of newsmen.

That effort has little if anything to do with

the question of formal diplomatic relations with China.

It has much to do with

an eyes-opened rather than an eyes-closed policy on an area which carries the
most far-reaching implications for the future of the nation and the peace of
the world.
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In a similar vein, I refer to the situation in Outer Mongolia.

Merely

to mentj.on Outer t-1ongolia in a serious vein is to invite a humorous reaction or
at best, a look of perplexity.

While it

m~y

be

~iffictut

to

gr~sp

the relation-

ship of a vast stretch of deserts and desolate mountains in Central Asia to
major trends in world affairs, the relationship, nevertheless, is there.

It is

there, because in those deserts and mountains, the outward pulsations of Chinese
and Russian society converge in a setting "\-Thich is not, in the least, fixed or
static.
Brought into

~irect

juxtaposition in this fashion are two great

powers, to sets of national interests and fears as well as two variations of
a shared ideology.

That is the reality, whatever may be the apparent uni-

versality of international communism.

How these national interests and these

ideological variations reconcile or diverge, how these fears intensify or relax on contact--these questions involving Russia and China are of the greatest
significance for the conduct of effective foreign policy.

Indeed, the im-

portance of this contact has been recognized in the many words which have been
written by skilled people on this question, without specific reference to
Outer Mongolia.
In Outer Mongolia, however, the living drama of the convergence is
being enacted.

It has been brilliantly described by t4r . Harrison Salisbury

of the new York Times who visited the area last year.

If there is any need

for evidence of the extraordinary value to the people of this nation and,
indeed, to the government, of competent American journalists penetrating Hhere
the government does not choose to tread, I would most respectfully submit
these articles by t-ir . Salisbury .
According to Mr. Salisbury, Chinese and Russians in large numbers
are present in that borderland .

Separate missions from each are at work on

- 5 -

separate undertakings.

Each acknowledges, formally, the national independence

of the Mongolian people but each seeks to influence the orientation and development of the Mongols in its own fashion.

The picture which emerges from Hr.

Salisbury's articles is by no means one of a monolithic, single-minded communist super-state extending from Eastern

Euro~e

to Peking.

He have chosen in official policy--under both Democratic and Republican Administrations--not to be first-hand witnesses to the drama in Outer
Mongolia .

We have chosen, apparently, to exclude ourselves from the legitimate

and continuing observations which would be possible in Outer Mongolia, if official contact were maintained with that country, observations which would be
extremely helpful in the formulation of effective policies with regard to all
of Asia as well as Russia.
So far as I am aware we have not explored the possibilities of some
kind of formal ties with the Mongolian government at Ulan Bator.

That is the

case although the arguments against recognition of Peking do not apply in this
situation and there are indications that the Mongolian government, which is
recognized by certain Asian countries, is anxious to establish contact w.ith
Western states .

Further, we have frowned upon the admission of Outer t-1ongolia

to the United Uations.

He apparently have marked it, and perhaps in error, as

just another Soviet province.

In short, we may well be imprisoning our policies

in an unnecessary separation of ourselves from a most valuable source of information and official contact in the heart of Asia, out of inadequate facts, inertia
or a fear of derision.
The decision to act in the case of Outer Mongolia, as in the case of
a reciprocal exchange of newsmen with the Chinese mainland is one which rests
with the Administration.

I suggest, however, that we stand to gain by an

..
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initiative in this remote and

little-kno~rn

but highly significant area.

I have

yet to see any persuasive reason why we should not offer to exchange exploratory
missions with the Outer Mongolian governme:.1t 'N'i th a view to considering the
establishment of diplomatic or other ties.

Further, I believe this

governmen~

should propose in the United Nations that the Outer Mongolian government, if it
still desires admission to that organization, should exchange missions with the
Secretary-General of the

u.n.

If the Secretary-General finds a reasonable basis

--comparable to some of the other admissions with which that organization has
been able to live--if he finds a reasonable basis for the admission of Outer
Mongolia then the United States should not stand in the way.

